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Shell in this process are strongly related to asset specificity and the need for adaptive 
mutual coordination and integration. In a situation in which asset specificity is high and 
where adaptive responses are important, TCE reasoning suggests internal (hierarchical) 
governance to prevail because of its superior ability to foster coordinated adaptation. Shell, 
however, opted for hybrid control. But our analysis demonstrates that the new, intendedly 
hybrid structure mimics the hierarchy in almost all fundamental respects, and that it func-
tions in an intrinsically hierarchical way. These findings are in line with TCE, and our study 
provides an illustration of the relevance of TCE in making sense of control. 
 
Key words: Management control, Transaction cost economics, Case research 
 
 1
Reinventing the Hierarchy: 
The Case of the Shell Chemicals Carve-out 
 
1. Introduction 
At the end of 1998, Shell announced a major restructuring of its chemical business. This 
restructuring involved a divestment of about 40% of Shell’s portfolio within the ensuing year 
through the sale of individual businesses to third parties. The announcement was the start of 
an intense and difficult process that became known as the chemicals carve-out. Divestment 
required disentangling of highly integrated production sites into separate packages of activi-
ties that could be sold as individual, stand-alone businesses. It also forced an incisive redesign 
of the governance structure. Whereas before the restructuring, sites operated under unified 
Shell ownership, the new situation required a control structure to accommodate several 
owners on one site, and to handle the vast amount of transactions between the new owners 
and the remaining Shell businesses on that site. 
 This paper reports on this carve-out process and –particularly- on the related control 
issues at the Hoogvliet site in the Netherlands. Our analysis shows that many of the problems 
encountered by Shell in this process are strongly related to the difficulties involved in defin-
ing boundaries in production processes that are heavily interdependent and that, conse-
quently, require close coordination and careful integration. In fact, the degree of interde-
pendence was such that the individual entities created through the carve-out could never 
really act autonomously, their operation being profoundly locked-in between upstream and 
downstream stages owned by others. Much of the control structure that evolved can be 
understood as being designed to support sequential and coordinated adaptation and to 
mitigate the vulnerability to self-seeking behaviour by the other parties to the arrangement 
that arises as a result of interdependence. These issues are central to the perspective of 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE; Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996), and this case study provides 
an illustration of the relevance of TCE in explaining control structure design (Ouchi, 1980; 
Speklé, 2001; Spicer and Ballew, 1983; Tiessen and Waterhouse, 1983). But it does that in a 
rather peculiar way. TCE reasoning would predict that in the circumstances of the case –in 
which asset specificity is paramount- hierarchical governance would prevail because of its 
superior ability to foster coordinated adaptation (Williamson, 1985, 1996; cf. also Mahoney, 
1992). However, Shell opted for hybrid arrangements instead. A prima facie, this may be 
taken to undermine TCE’s status, one of its paradigmatic predictions being challenged by the 
evidence of the case. But this study reveals that the ultimate governance structure mimics 
hierarchical governance in many important ways. Thus, Shell abandoned the hierarchical 
structure, only to reinstall it in the guise of a hybrid. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized in three main sections. Section 2 reports on the 
facts of the case and provides some details on our methods. Section 3 introduces TCE and 
analyses the case from this theoretical perspective. Section 4 discusses the analysis and 
findings. 
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2. The Shell Chemicals carve-out 
2.1 Methods 
During the period of time covered in this study, one of the authors worked as a Business 
Economist with Shell at Hoogvliet, and was deeply involved in the carve-out process. At the 
end of 1999, he was appointed Finance Manager of one of the carved-out entities, which was 
subsequently sold to a third party. He remained with that entity for several months to facili-
tate the transition to new ownership. After that, he returned to Shell. Thus, our insights have 
been gained from one of us being deeply immersed in the organization studied, and from 
being personally involved in the events described here. This permitted unrestrained access to 
data and informants, and greatly facilitated interpretation of what transpired. On the other 
hand, this involvement could have introduced some bias in the account. After all, the carve-
out was an absorbing and sometimes painful process, putting considerable stress on the 
organization and the participants. However, in this study we focus not so much on the social 
side of the process, but more on the structures that resulted and the associated control 
issues. These are less susceptible to subconscious bias. We also took care in checking the 
observations against formal documents and other data, and we asked and received comments 
from several insiders on our original manuscript. Additionally, the role of the other author 
-acting from greater distance- has been instrumental in mitigating an all too personal ac-
count. 
2.2 Some background 
Shell has been a player in the chemicals industry since 1929, mainly in the USA and Western 
Europe. Oil and gas being important raw materials for the chemicals industry, the move into 
chemicals was a rather natural step for an oil company, and integrating oil refining and 
chemical production had synergetic effects in respect of availability and flexibility of feed-
stock supply. Shell’s chemical activities grew rapidly with the rise of the petrochemical 
industry in the 1950s, and since that time, Shell has been an important actor in the bulk 
market for petrochemicals. Over the years, the portfolio expanded to include speciality 
products. However, by the end of 1998, Shell announced a major restructuring of the portfo-
lio. Only businesses where Shell had a competitive market share and a record for growth 
would be retained, whereas other businesses were to be sold to outside buyers. This implied a 
stronger focus on base chemicals and a reduced exposure in speciality products. The divest-
ment decision affected about 40% of the chemicals portfolio. 
 At the time of the announcement, the chemical activities were organized in a matrix 
structure, in which Product Business Units (PBUs) of Shell Chemicals Ltd. were responsible for 
managing the product portfolio worldwide and across sites, whereas regional Operating 
Companies (OpCos) were responsible for operational site management1. A typical petrochemi-
cal site provides production facilities, utilities, and services for several PBUs in the chemicals 
                                                 
1 Shell Chemicals Ltd. and the matrix structure were established in 1998 –only one year before 
the carve-out exercise. Prior to 1998, the chemical businesses were structured as regional 
companies. 
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business, but also for Shell’s oil activities. Figure 1 provides a simplified description of such a 
site. 
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Figure 1: Simplified illustration of a petrochemical site 
 
 The figure illustrates that on a typical site, there are multiple product flows between 
several factories that are part of different PBUs and legal entities. A by-product of a process 
in one factory may be the main feedstock (raw material) for another factory, whereas all 
factories use the same site utilities (e.g. electricity, water, and steam) and share a number of 
services provided by the OpCo (e.g. warehousing, tanks, office buildings, maintenance, etc.). 
A significant part of these flows were fixed in the sense that it would not have been possible 
to operate a production unit without guaranteed access to upstream or downstream units, 
either for reasons of a technological nature (technological inseparability), or because re-
course to alternative sources of supply and demand would have been prohibitively costly. 
Thus, operations were highly integrated, and there was a high level of interdependence 
between operating units on a site. Divesture of parts of the portfolio required the identifica-
tion and definition of viable packages of assets, services, product flows, and other resources 
that could be sold as separate businesses to third parties. Or to use Shell’s own terminology: 
businesses needed to be ‘carved-out’ of the larger structure. 
2.3 The carve-out process 
The divestment was unprecedented within the industry, and Shell Chemicals itself had no 
experience with a restructuring operation of this nature and impact. It was clear from the 
outset that the restructuring was extremely complex, involving a multitude of difficult issues 
in the areas of portfolio choice (which businesses were to remain with Shell and which would 
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be offered for sale), package boundary definition (what is part of the business to be divested, 
how does this business interact with other businesses on site, which materials flows and 
services are necessary to run the business, who is going to provide these, etc.), legal affairs 
(contractual arrangements, establishing new legal entities), intellectual property (patents, 
trade secrets), human resources (reconfiguring employment contracts, retirement benefits), 
safety regulations (assuring compliance of new parties to Shell’s safety standards and poli-
cies), and the like. But there also was serious time pressure deriving from Shell’s public 
commitment to complete much of the restructuring within the year 1999. Thus, Shell needed 
a project structure that: (1) brought together the required areas of expertise so that all 
relevant aspects and dimensions were adequately covered; (2) facilitated interaction and 
learning between and within the areas to ensure rapid development and accumulation of 
specialized, process-specific know-how; and (3) could act fast so as to realize the ambitions 
within the time horizon of less than a year. This was done by installing a multi-layer matrix 
structure that combined functional expertise, product-related knowledge, and site-specific 
know-how and experience. Figure 2 sketches this structure. 
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Figure 2: The carve-out organization 
 
 At the level of the PBUs that were to be divested, site teams were formed that were 
responsible for initial boundary definition of the activities at a particular site. At Hoogvliet, 
four such teams were created: (1) Resins; (2) Elastomers; (3) Carilon; and (4) Polystyrene. 
The task of these teams was to prepare viable packages that could be sold. This involved 
sometimes arduous negotiations with PBUs that remained within Shell (so-called foundation 
businesses), particularly around issues of feedstock. Consider for instance the technical set-
up for the production of rubbers (PBU Elastomers). Basically, the set-up converts a raw 
stream of isoprene (also known as C5) into isoprene rubbers. This is done in a sequential 
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process, involving several production units. The first unit converts the raw C5 into an isoprene 
feed that is converted into rubbers in subsequent units. The first unit is owned by a founda-
tion PBU but is an integral part of the set-up to produce rubbers. But the isoprene feed is also 
used for other purposes not related to the production of rubbers. The Elastomers PBU argued 
that a viable package includes the basic preparation unit, whereas the foundation PBU 
claimed that unit to be indissolubly connected with its own activities, and that divesting it 
would destroy value for Shell. Usually, arguments such as these could not be settled with hard 
evidence, and the process became very much a political one. Feedstock costing and pricing 
was also problematic. Feedstock for a particular unit often arises as a joint product in a 
production process in an upstream unit. Joint cost allocation methods are always arbitrary 
(Thomas, 1980) and, consequently, open to controversy. In the absence of relevant market 
prices -which was not uncommon- pricing needed to be based on costs and became similarly 
contentious. This inherent ambiguity, coupled with the overwhelming complexity of the 
operation, triggered the need for additional assurance, and independent auditors were asked 
to perform due diligence investigations. Considering that the packages were based on numer-
ous assumptions, allocations, and informal agreements, it is hardly surprising that auditors 
were very cautious, and were often reluctant to provide official assurance. As a result, 
assurance costs were substantial. 
 The carved-out packages also required definition of site-specific services to which access 
should be provided. Site services were referred to as SUMFs (Services, Utilities, Materials, and 
Facilities). Prior to the carve-out, SUMFs were somewhat opaque. It was not entirely clear 
which SUMFs were provided, and which parts of the site benefited. SUMFs were seen as just 
another site overhead, and their costs were allocated to the collected site business in a way 
that bore only rough correspondence to actual consumption. That was fairly unproblematic in 
the original situation of unified ownership (see, however, note 3), but now SUMFs needed to 
be reorganized to increase transparency and to allow their inclusion in the packages. On some 
occasions this required technical adjustments, as for instance the installation of steam 
meters to track steam use. It also involved a redesign of the accounting information system. 
SUMFs had to be offered to the new owners on a commercially sound basis. Where free 
markets for comparable services existed, SUMFs could be configured in relation to these 
market equivalents. However, many SUMFs lacked a meaningful market benchmark and had to 
be provided on a cost-plus basis, in which costs were calculated using some form of activity 
based costing not previously employed. All this became the task of the SUMF team, which was 
responsible for unravelling SUMFs and for linking specific SUMFs to specific users so as to 
provide input for the boundary definition efforts of the PBU teams. 
 Site leaders formed a steering committee to coordinate and supervise site teams (PBU-
teams and the SUMF team). Access to functional expertise (e.g. legal affairs, finance, tax, 
HSE (Health, Safety and Environment), information technology, feedstock, etc.) required in 
the carve-out process was available through global carve-out teams. These teams kept track 
of the process from their functional perspective, assuring a structured, consistent and in-
formed approach, and supplying advice, guidelines, templates, draft contracts and the like to 
the teams operating on the level of the PBUs and the sites. Their role was particularly impor-
tant because of the need to create a reasonable degree of uniformity within businesses and 
across sites to be prepared for the likely event that one party would acquire businesses 
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operating on several sites. At the apex of the entire operation was the Portfolio Task Force; a 
team of senior executives specifically held responsible for the quick and successful comple-
tion of the portfolio restructuring. 
2.4 The new governance structure 
Before the carve-out, the Hoogvliet site operated almost entirely under unified Shell owner-
ship2, and its control structure can roughly be described as one large bureaucracy (in the 
fairly neutral meaning attached to that term by for instance Mintzberg, 1983, and Ouchi, 
1980). Although the site harboured assets and businesses owned by multiple legal entities 
(OpCos, Shell Chemicals Ltd., Shell Oil Products), in the end the assets, businesses and 
entities were all part of the Shell group, and they were managed and controlled as such. The 
restructuring operation changed this quite dramatically, and the unified organization was 
supplanted by a structure of (quasi-)autonomous entities, bound together by a multitude of 
contractual arrangements. This observation not only holds for the divested businesses and 
their relations with Shell-owned parties on the site, but it also applies to (parts of) the 
relations between businesses that remained with Shell. This is perhaps most evident in the 
SUMF area. Whereas previously, SUMFs operated as cost centres, their costs being absorbed in 
a rather inarticulate way by the entire complex, they were now asked to act as businesses 
themselves. Although this new commercial orientation was prompted by the creation of 
outside demand (i.e. the new owners), it spilled-over to internal transactions as well. As a 
result, internal transactions acquired a more pronounced arm’s length flavour3. 
 The bulk of the contracts between Shell and the owners of the divested business were 
related to SUMFs, feedstock, and operational management. SUMFs were divided into long-
term and short-term arrangements. A short-term SUMF was only offered for one year. After 
that year, the buyer had to find another supplier for that service (e.g. payroll or logistics 
services). Long-term SUMFs mostly related to site-specific assets and services required by all 
parties on the site, be they Shell-owned or otherwise. These included for instance site 
utilities like electricity, water, and steam. Contract durations for long-term SUMFs were 
either set at three years (reflecting the maximum duration allowed by EU competition law), 
or were left unspecified. Feedstock contracts and operating arrangements usually spanned a 
period of at least five years. As may be expected from the intricate nature of the transac-
tions, contracts were complex and lengthy, and meticulously specified rights and obligations 
of the parties. But they also contained provisions not frequently found in autonomous party 
contracting, particularly relating to dispute resolution and joint planning. 
 On several occasions, contracts between Shell and the divested businesses provided for 
the establishment of a joint committee of representatives of both parties to which to refer 
                                                 
2 There were some exceptions. A few third parties already operated on the Hoogvliet site 
before the carve-out as a result from joint venture activities or previous asset sales. 
3 This was an expected –and welcomed- by-product of the carve-out exercise. In the original 
situation, SUMFs were not particularly high on the managerial agenda. They were approached 
rather phlegmatically, at least partly because management lacked the information critically 
to assess costs and benefits. Shell believed that the increased transparency of services and 
costs would heighten management’s involvement in this field, and would increase efficiency. 
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disputes. This committee was expected amicably to resolve disputes. Should this committee 
be unable to settle the differences, there was a steering committee to act as a court of 
appeal. This steering committee comprised senior representatives of both parties and was 
-again- held to try to solve the problem amicably. If all this were to fail, the agreements 
stipulated third party arbitration. 
 Many contracts also featured joint planning and a reliance on annual plans and budgets. 
The third party owner would provide quarterly forecasts of production, whilst Shell prepared 
budgets for operating expenses. Thus, quantities and prices were not decided upon and fixed 
in the contract, but were subjected to annual negotiations, allowing for flexibility and 
sequential adaptation to conditions as they evolved. The budgets and plans required approval 
of the joint steering committee, and the approved budget was subsequently paid to Shell in 
monthly instalments. Formats of budgets and individual line items were specified at length in 
the contract appendices. Deviations from plan and budget again required joint committee 
approval, and payments were adjusted for actual costs at year-end. These costs were sub-
jected to buyer’s monitoring, and several contracts specified audit rights, allowing parties to 
perform audits on areas that were part of the agreement. 
 A number of important quality dimensions of the transactions were also left unspecified 
in the contracts, requiring parties to negotiate these as time went by. Parties were expected 
to decide annually on a set of targets for key performance indicators (KPIs), e.g. accident 
frequency rate, lost time injury rate, plant production rate, plant on-stream factors, quality 
performance, and fixed cost management. These KPIs were linked to compensation through a 
variable pay incentive scheme. 
3. Analysing governance: a Transaction Cost Economics perspective 
3.1 Some theoretical backgrounds 
TCE seeks to uncover the economic mechanisms that explain institutions of governance and 
their habitat. The main thrust of TCE’s perspective is that a specific institutional arrange-
ment is chosen to govern a specific transaction because that arrangement offers some distinc-
tive set of control devices that is uniquely tailored to the control needs of that transaction. 
Thus, TCE submits that transactions differ in respect of the contractual problems to which 
they give rise, whilst organizational forms differ in their problem-solving ability, so that 
alignments between the two can be explained by explicating the efficacy and efficiency of 
the match. 
 According to TCE, modelling contracting-related human behaviour must make allowance 
for bounded rationality and opportunism. Bounded rationality refers to man’s limited cogni-
tive and computational ability. Opportunism is “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 
1985: 47), which may include calculated efforts to mislead and deceive. Given bounded 
rationality and opportunism, the nature and magnitude of contracting problems are associ-
ated with the characteristics of the transaction in question. Transactions can be scored 
discriminatingly on three dimensions: (1) asset specificity; (2) uncertainty (including complex-
ity, which is similar to uncertainty in its effects); and (3) frequency. Asset specificity denotes 
the presence of opportunity losses that arise if the investments made to support the transac-
tion are to be put to alternative uses or users. Uncertainty refers to the degree of specifiabil-
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ity of intended performance and predictability of (the influence of) the environment within 
which the contract is to be executed. Frequency can do without a definition; it has no 
peculiar connotations in TCE. 
 Basically, contracting problems are problems of adaptation. Uncertainty and bounded 
rationality jointly determine when and why the need to adapt is likely to arise, whereas asset 
specificity in conjunction with opportunism explain when and why achievement of successful 
adaptation cannot be taken for granted. Uncertainty inhibits the ex ante specification of 
required performance in a comprehensive, state-contingent way. Bounded rationality of 
course aggravates this problem. Therefore, contracts are bound to be incomplete, and 
increasingly so when uncertainty rises. However, information on the desirable properties of 
the transaction and on the actual state of nature may become available during the process of 
contract execution. This new information allows contractual gaps to be filled and activates 
the need to realign contract execution with emerging insights. Yet gap filling and realignment 
are not self-enforcing but may require renegotiation. These renegotiations are not necessarily 
cooperative because of opportunism. The room for such behaviour depends on the degree of 
asset specificity and on the existence of information asymmetry. Asset specificity refers to 
the size of the opportunity losses that will be incurred in case of premature termination. The 
value of these losses is -in absence of sufficiently powerful safeguards- exposed to the risk of 
opportunistic expropriation, and hence provides a measure of the potential gains from 
opportunism and of the intensity of the incentive to engage in such behaviour. 
 Economic actors try to cope with problems of contracting by means of organization, i.e. 
by adopting appropriate organizational arrangements to govern their transactions. At a 
generic level, TCE defines three distinct modes of governance: (1) markets; (2) hybrids; and 
(3) hierarchies (or internalization). These alternative governance structures differ in the 
control mechanisms they employ to safeguard contract execution and to achieve successful 
adaptation. Market governance derives control from free competition. The hybrid form of 
governance is typically based on explicit, long-term contracts in conjunction with additional 
safeguards to assure compliance. Hierarchical governance attains control primarily by means 
of authority, internal incentive structures, and monitoring. But the structural options also 
differ in respect of costs. These include the costs of drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding 
the transaction, but also the (opportunity) cost of failures to align the transaction with 
changing circumstances. TCE’s main theme is that transactions -which differ in their attrib-
utes- are aligned with governance structures -which differ in their costs and competencies- in 
a discriminating, economizing way. 
3.2 Comparing hybrids and hierarchies 
The term hybrid governance refers to long-term contractual relations between autonomous 
parties. It differs from market control in that the hybrid form offers additional transaction-
specific safeguards such as hostage arrangements and specialized dispute settlement institu-
tions that serve to advance compliance to the provisions of the contract. Hostages are 
investments or transfers of wealth, the full value of which can only be recovered in case of 
successful contract execution. They curtail the potential gains from opportunistic defection, 
thus providing a safeguard against such behaviour. 
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 Hybrids are associated with transactions of moderate asset specificity and limited 
uncertainty. The market’s invisible hand breaks down when asset specificity increases, 
because rising asset specificity implies erosion of competition and increasing switching costs. 
Then, a stronger contractual tie-in is required, and the hybrid form offers this. However, 
hybrid governance is especially vulnerable to uncertainty. Increasing uncertainty lessens the 
comprehensiveness of the contract, and leaves more to be decided on as time goes by. In a 
hybrid governance regime, adaptation to contingencies that were not foreseen at the time of 
contract specification usually requires renegotiation and mutual consent. That, of course, 
takes time, and if parties to a hybrid agreement are negotiating a response to one distur-
bance only to be hit by another, failures to adapt predictably arise (cf. Williamson, 1996: 
116). Moreover, such renegotiations provide an arena for opportunistic behaviour, especially 
in conjunction with substantial asset specificity and information asymmetry. Although the 
hybrid has access to additional safeguards such as hostages and arbitration, these are usually 
imperfect and cannot fully prevent costly haggling and maladaptation. And the autonomy of 
the parties in a hybrid arrangement is not particularly conducive to communication, informa-
tion sharing, and the development of a mutual understanding. 
 When governance structures are needed that more reliably secure adaptive, cooperative 
attitudes and actions when it comes to filling the contractual gaps, hierarchical governance 
may be appropriate. The hierarchical solution is to evade conflicts of interest between 
contracting parties by releasing the link between compensation and the direct outcomes of 
the transaction. This practice establishes quite a large zone of indifference that supports 
cooperation and in which choices and changes can be implemented by simple managerial fiat. 
The reliance on managerial discretion offers decision-making flexibility and permits sequen-
tial adaptation to events as they unfold. Moreover, the hierarchy has superior communication 
and monitoring properties. These derive from shared experience and more congenial interac-
tion, and support converging perceptions and a deeper and subtler common understanding of 
what goes on (Williamson, 1975). However, internalization is no panacea. As compared to 
hybrids and –particularly- markets, the hierarchical incentives to adapt are relatively flat. 
Their compensation being relatively unaffected by performance, actors in a hierarchical 
setting may be somewhat slow to act on changing circumstances. And on a more general note, 
managerial coordination, the required administrative apparatus and information systems are 
obviously quite costly to apply. 
3.3 An analysis of the case 
As is quite clear from the case description, many of the arrangements between Shell and the 
divested units involved transactions that display strikingly high levels of asset specificity. For 
instance, many of the long term SUMFs were related to indispensable site utilities like elec-
tricity, water, and steam. For these utilities, a real separation would not have been feasible 
for technical or economic reasons. Here, a monopolistic situation arises in which Shell is 
effectively the only supplier available. This monopoly is more or less bilateral, for the pro-
duction capacity retained to service the buyer has no alternative uses outside the set of 
current consumers –at least not in the short run. Similar degrees of asset specificity were 
present in matters of feedstock and operations. The Resin business for instance was bought by 
a so-called financial buyer who lacked the organization and the expertise to run the business 
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by itself. This buyer entered into an agreement with Shell in which Shell remained the 
operator of the factory on behalf of the new owner. As before, parties become locked-in and 
bilateral dependency arises. The buyer can only take over operations at the expense of 
considerable cost. Shell on the other hand has invested in specialized human and physical 
assets to perform its operator role. These investments are not easily redeployed. Thus, 
whereas the carve-out operation resulted in multiple parties that were independent in a 
formal sense, they remained in fact heavily dependent upon one another, and they needed a 
structure to support ongoing adaptive and responsive mutual coordination to events as they 
unfolded. In the original situation, hierarchical governance provided the necessary mecha-
nisms. The typical hybrid form is less able to handle adaptation, and the actual contractual 
arrangements show parties to be aware of this problem in that these arrangements differ 
from standard hybrids in a number of significant ways. 
 Firstly, the contracts seem to acknowledge the impossibility comprehensively to fix 
mutual responsibilities and obligations in advance. Important dimensions such as prices, 
quantities and quality (KPIs) were largely left open in the contracts, their values being 
decided on in annual negotiations. The contracts did, however, stipulate how these negotia-
tions were to be conducted (e.g. procedures, budget formats), thus more or less setting the 
stage for subsequent gap filling. Secondly, the contracts showed a concern for non-
cooperative behaviour, or more generally, for the possibility of conflict –either driven by 
opportunism or arising from sincere differences in perceptions or opinions. The dispute 
settlement structure was established on that account. This structure was designed to contrib-
ute to benign conflict resolution. In a typical hybrid, dispute settlement is left to an arbiter, 
or sometimes to the court. Third party arbitration and -especially- court ordering are very 
much institutions of last resort, only called upon when things really go out of hand (William-
son, 1979). The two bipartite committees provided for in the contracts (the joint committee 
and the steering committee) differ from arbitrage and court ordering in that they are more 
accessible, and are better positioned to reconcile differences before they become full-blown 
conflicts. Also, these internal committees have access to intimate internal experience and 
knowledge –some of which cannot easily be communicated to outsiders-, and their decisions 
are likely to reflect a fuller understanding of what is at stake. 
 It is interesting to note that these governance devices are essentially copied from the 
hierarchy. Coordination through sequential planning and budgeting and internal conflict 
settlement are at the heart of hierarchical governance, and Shell can be said to have im-
ported hierarchical elements into its new hybrid structure to alleviate this structure’s disad-
vantages in respect of adaptability and conflict resolution. As a result, the new hybrid 
appears to replicate many of the strong points of the governance structure that obtained 
before the carve-out. But the reverse is also true, and the new structure copies the hierar-
chy’s typical weaknesses too. In general, the hybrid enjoys a potential advantage over the 
hierarchy in respect of incentive intensity. This term refers to “the degree to which a party 
reliably appropriates the net receipts (which could be negative) associated with its efforts 
and decisions” (Williamson, 1996: 378). Higher incentive intensity stimulates a more vigilant 
attitude and a higher propensity to act on changing circumstances. However, the reliance on 
mutual decision-making and the general orientation towards compromises as found in this 
case are likely to dull incentives, and Shell’s hybrid is hardly less given to bureaucratic inertia 
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than the typical hierarchy. To be sure, the carve-out operation seems to have increased 
overall incentive intensity. This was basically achieved through the increased transparency of 
SUMFs described in section 2, which allowed clearer accountability in this area and a stronger 
orientation on results. But this effect is essentially independent of the move towards hybrid 
governance, for it was also experienced within the remains of Shell’s hierarchical control 
structure where a shift was made from relatively flat, inward-looking machine control to a 
structure with more market-oriented arm’s length control characteristics (cf. Speklé, 2001). 
And there is no indication that Shell’s hybrid arrangements differ significantly from compara-
ble internal arrangements in respect of incentive intensity. 
 The overall conclusion seems to be that the new hybrid structure mimics the hierarchy in 
almost all fundamental respects (i.e. cooperative adaptation, conflict resolution, and incen-
tive intensity), and that it must be expected to operate in a basically hierarchical way. 
However, although this may be true in normal, business-as-usual circumstances, it is less 
clear how the structure will perform in more strenuous conditions and over a longer period of 
time. What will happen if changing circumstances require some major adjustment in regular 
business patterns? Will joint planning still be amicable? In Shell’s relations with the new 
owners, adaptation seems to be governed to a large extent by habitual notions of reasonable-
ness and equitableness. Whereas these may be meaningful concepts in stable conditions, they 
easily become elusive when they must be applied in a different context. And what about 
incentives to invest? Many assets being allocated to joint purposes, subsequent investment 
poses intricate distribution issues as to the costs and benefits. These issues may lead to an 
impasse, resulting in underinvestment4 (cf. for instance Baiman and Rajan (2002) for a survey 
of the relevant literature). And what will happen at contract renewal negotiations? The 
restructuring being a recent event, these questions cannot be answered from actual experi-
ence. But there is little reason to be unreservedly optimistic. 
4. Discussion 
The details of this case and the subsequent analysis suggest two broad issues that warrant 
additional discussion. The first relates to the observation that a conspicuously hierarchical 
control structure arose even though the original intention of the carve-out was to externalize 
businesses that were no longer considered to fit strategy. The second has to do with control 
structure efficiency: if the result of the carve-out operation is a control structure that is 
basically a copy of the original one –but an expensive one to make, and a somewhat flawed 
one too- why did Shell go through with it? Consider these in turn. 
 For transactions that score high on asset specificity, TCE predicts hierarchical governance 
to prevail, especially when uncertainty as to future developments require flexibility and 
                                                 
4 In the Shell-case, such ‘hold-up hazards’ may particularly easily become real because many 
contracts are of the cost-plus type. Suppose Shell encounters an opportunity to invest in some 
set-up that would lower the operating costs of a particular SUMF without affecting its value. 
The contract may require Shell to pass on part of the cost savings to the third parties operat-
ing on the site. If Shell is to bear the full cost of the investment, its willingness to make that 
investment decreases. 
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responsiveness. In the transactions at stake in the case, both attributes are present to a 
significant degree. Nonetheless, Shell opted for hybrid governance. A prima facie, this seems 
to be at odds with TCE’s logic, and may cast some doubt on TCE’s informative power. On 
deeper reflection, however, the case reveals that the actual structure mimics hierarchical 
governance in many important ways. If judged by the outcome alone, it is almost as if Shell 
deliberately sought to reproduce hierarchical governance as closely as possible. This, how-
ever, was not the case. On the contrary, rather, the carve-out operation was in fact intended 
to remove non-core businesses from the Shell sphere as rigorously as feasible. Against this 
background, the resulting structure with its still intimate ties with the carved-out businesses 
may well have disappointed Shell. Then, the case –rather than being recalcitrant- actually 
offers quite strong support for TCE’s position in that it provides a telling illustration of the 
pervasive need to get the structure right (Williamson, 1998) –‘right’ being inherently hierar-
chical when asset specificity is paramount and uncertainty is substantial5. 
 But then, why did Shell go through with it? After all, the carve-out turned out to be a 
very costly operation, involving considerable expenses (e.g. adjustments to logistical and 
administrative systems, due diligence investigations, benchmark studies, legal advice, etc.), 
as well as significant opportunity costs –mainly because the carve-out absorbed the larger 
part of management’s and staff’s attention for about a year. Why would Shell want to fund 
such a complex and arduous operation when the outcome is very much a replication of what 
was already there? We do not wish to make a thorough evaluation of the wisdom of Shell in 
this matter. Neither do we have the data required to perform such an evaluation. We do, 
however, want to suggest and discuss a few factors that may be relevant here. 
 One possible factor is of a psychological nature. Duhaime and Schwenk (1985) argue that 
divestment decisions generally are complex and ambiguous, and that such decision processes 
are characterized by cognitive simplification for reasons of bounded rationality. The use of 
simplifying heuristics, however, may introduce biases in the decisions which may help to 
explain why actual decisions may appear questionable when studied with the benefit of 
hindsight. Drawing from the organizational behaviour and cognitive psychology literatures, 
they argue that decision makers may become trapped in a course of action, thereby losing 
sight of alternatives (‘single outcome calculation’) and becoming unable to reconsider their 
choices, even in the face of negative feedback (‘escalating commitment’). We cannot rule 
out the possibility that Shell’s behaviour is to some extent an instance of this. However, the 
relevance of this potential explanation seems limited in the Shell case. Although from a 
control point of view (at least at the individual site level) it can be argued that Shell would 
perhaps have been better off had it preserved its hierarchical control structure, the evidence 
of the case suggests that Shell actually was well aware of the problems inherent in its pre-
ferred course of action, and that it did take appropriate action to alleviate these problems 
                                                 
5 An alternative explanation would be that the new structure resembled the original one 
merely as a result of Shell’s inability to break away from long-standing habits and routines. 
This, however, is not very convincing, if only because it cannot account for the new owners’ 
apparent acceptance of the structure. Surely, they did not bear the burden of custom, and 
the most plausible reason for the new owners to accept the arrangement is that it must have 
made sense to them. 
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-the incorporation of the hierarchical elements in the intendedly hybrid structure may be 
interpreted as such. Shell was definitely not running blind. 
 Another factor that needs attention becomes apparent when considering the limitations 
of our study. It must be emphasized that our study was restricted to one site only, and that 
our focus has been on governance issues at the level of that particular site. It is entirely 
possible, though, that there were in fact positive effects for Shell as a whole, perhaps in the 
form of enhanced strategic focus at higher management levels and better returns on man-
agement, improved capital allocation, et cetera. At least, there is a large literature suggest-
ing that there are limits to manageable diversification, that many divestments are in fact 
driven by the need to reduce diversification, and that reduced diversification (i.e. enhanced 
focus) has a positive effect on subsequent performance (cf. for instance Bergh, 1995; Hoskis-
son and Turk, 1990; Johnson, 1996; Markides, 1995). In this respect, it is interesting to note 
that the general public seemed to like the idea; the common thread in newspaper coverage of 
the carve-out being that it was about time for Shell to restructure its portfolio. 
 But the case also shows that reduced diversification does not always come easy. Our 
study indicates that Shell encountered a difficult dilemma in which strategic intentions and 
control needs interact in a complicated way. Thus, whereas our observations suggest that 
Shell intended to craft a sharp and clean exit from parts of the chemicals industry, our 
analysis implies that Shell was unable to realize this ambition for reasons of a control nature, 
forcing Shell to maintain strong ties with the businesses it no longer wanted. Although this 
probably overstates the case, one may even argue that these ties were so strong that the 
carved-out businesses effectively remained an integral part of Shell’s strategy. Be that as it 
may, our study does indicate that control considerations may encumber strategic choice, and 
may drive a wedge between strategic intent on the one hand, and actual strategy as inferred 
from organizational actions, beliefs, and decisions (cf. Dermer, 1988; Mintzberg, 1978; 
Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) on the other. This more or less inverts the classic notion of 
structure-follows-strategy (Chandler, 1962), and emphasizes that the reverse may also be 
true. Actual strategy may be sticky and relatively insensitive to changing managerial agendas 
because of –in this particular case- the pervasive control demands that derive from asset 
specificity and that operate as an exit barrier6. The structure that ultimately arose may then 
be thought of as some form of compromise between strategic intentions (possibly reinforced 
by shareholders demanding increased focus) and control considerations. It is conceivable that 
the adopted structure was in fact the best one available, because in spite of its costs and 
deficiencies, it may well have been the one that least affected the integrity of Shell’s strate-
gic intentions. 
                                                 
6 In descriptive studies of divestments, it has often been noted that unit interdependence is 
an exit barrier and negatively affects the propensity to divest (cf. for example Duhaime and 
Grant, 1984, and Harrigan, 1985). Our study seems to offer an explanation for this empirical 
observation, suggesting that the idea of control considerations as (also) an antecedent of 
strategy may have meaning beyond the limits of this particular case. 
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